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1Fondo de Tierras (FONTIERRAS) in Guatemala is an autonomous decentralized State body, formed by 
the Peace Accords with national scope and authority, is legally registered and has its own resources. In 
this text the names FONTIERRA and Fondo de Tierras are used interchangeably. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Guatemala is one of the Latin American countries that continues to be characterized by 
the extreme importance of agricultural activities both socially and economically. 
Historically the agricultural sector has had an important impact on the national 
economy, representing 23% of the Gross National Product in 1997 and 61.4 % of the 
national population lived in rural areas in 2000.2 
 
Unequal land distribution is one of the fundamental issues faced by Guatemala, which is 
one of the Latin American countries with extreme inequality in land distribution. 
According to the Ministry for Agriculture, Grains and Food (MAGA in Spanish3) in 
1998, 96% of producers cultivated 20% of the land mass and lived in subsistence 
conditions. At the same time 0.2% of producers possessed 70% of the landmass, which 
was used for production of agricultural exports. 
  
These figures show that after more than thirty years of different government policies, 
initially promoted by the State and then later through structural adjustment theory, with  
market forces as the only regulator, land access and distribution in Guatemala remains 
highly exclusive.  
 
The policy of colonization simply reallocated land, replicating the latifundio-minifundio 
model without any impact on the existing land distribution and access structure. It did 
not represent integrated agrarian reform, instead corruption, plundering and 
monopolizing of land distorted any possibility of reform.  The traditional structure and 
concentration of land ownership was not challenged. Colonization did however 
maintain the seasonal labor force that worked on the large plantation farms producing 
agricultural exports. 
 
Principle criticisms of the reformist model illustrate that this model did not promote 
substantial changes in the existing agricultural structure. Instead it maintained the 
previous land distribution model whilst also generating a dual agricultural system; the 
agro export industry and the internal consumption of agricultural products. The agro 
export industry modernized, obtaining high productivity levels, whilst the traditional 
small-scale campesino4 farmers faced low productivity and poverty.  This model 
generated tension and secular conflict, high levels of instability, violence, social and 
political regression.  By the 1980’s  there was a radical move towards adjustment and 
market mechanisms as a solution to the agrarian problem. 
 
This new model totally dismantled the Sector Público Agrícola (SPA5 in Spanish), 
promoting a business approach, employing Social Funds and purchasing land through 
the market. The Peace Accords presented a renewed approach in market assisted land 
reform. Nevertheless, five years after the signing of the Peace Accords and more than 
20 years of adjustment, access to land, land use and holding remains practically the 
same.  
 
                                                 
2 UNDP, 2001. 
3 Ministerio de Agricultura, Ganadería y Alimentación 
4 Campesino: Latin American word used to describe poor rural farmers, who in Guatemala are 
predominately Indigenous and living in extreme poverty. 
5 SPA refers to all institutions, including the State that work in agriculture and agro industry. 
This summary of  “FONTIERRAS: The market model and access to land in Guatemala” 
presents the combined research undertaken by the Coordination of NGO and Co-
operatives (CONGCOOP in Spanish) and the National Coordination of Campesino 
Organizations (CNOC in Spanish). 
 
This study evaluates the role of the Fondo de Tierras (FONTIERRAS) which is the only 
option for Guatemalan campesinos to access land, using a broad theoretical framework 
that incorporates national and international issues related to the feasibility of market 
orientated land reform in developing countries.  
 
The theoretical framework of this study draws upon the conclusions of a series of 
studies undertaken by sectors of national and international civil society. These studies 
critically evaluate the impact of structural adjustment policies in developing countries, 
and illustrate that this approach does not provide a satisfactory solution to the social 
problems in developing countries. For land access policies to be efficient reforms must 
be accompanied by additional policy changes and general strengthening of the State to 
enable it to undertake a more protagonist role.  
 
The methodological framework of the study consisted of an in-depth literature review, 
semi-structured in-depth interviews, consultative workshops were held with the affected 
population in different regions of the country, case studies and visits to eight 
communities who are beneficiaries of FONTIERRAS in different regions of the country. 
 
The literature review revised papers by international financial organizations on the land 
market as well as critical analysis of “market assisted land reform” conducted by 
international networks and civil society organizations from countries in which this 
model has been implemented, and  FONTIERRAS Guatemala documents.  
 
Representatives from Washington based international finance organizations (USAID, 
World Bank, Inter American Development Bank), officials of FONTIERRAS and the 
Guatemalan Ministry for Agriculture, Grains and Food, experts on the land market in 
Guatemala, Peace Accord negotiators, leaders of campesino organizations and other 
civil society organizations working on land issues were interviewed.  
 
Consultative workshops were held in 23 Fondo de Tierras beneficiary communities in 
four regions of the country (Petén, the Northern, Southern and Western regions). The 
workshops provided a wealth of in depth information on the situation faced by the 
communities.  
 
The eight communities for the field visits were selected according to the following 
criteria to ensure a comparison of different situations: geographic location, membership 
or not of CNOC, different technical assistance firms and different phases in the land 
access process.  
 
Two extensive workshops were held in consultation with national experts on the theme 




1. THE “MARKET ASSISTED LAND REFORM” MODEL AND 
PEACE ACCORDS IN GUATEMALA 
 
It is a widely accepted fact that land ownership is highly concentrated in Latin America. 
According to international organizations such as the World Bank, the Inter American 
Development Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization and the Economic Commission 
of Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), this concentration of landholding 
presents two main disadvantages; limited efficiency in the use of land resources and 
very little social equity, which in turn causes extreme poverty. There is general 
consensus that an increase in the number of producers causes a positive effect in 
production, efficiency and equity, whilst excessive concentration of land generates an 
opposite effect. In this sense it is clear that improved distribution of land via agrarian 
reform is desirable and necessary.6 
 
Several different ideological approaches for promoting and achieving necessary changes 
exist.  Whilst some demand a high level of State intervention, for example with land 
expropriation, governments and international institutions advocate for a market based 
solution.  
 
The concept of “market assisted land reform”, first presented by the World Bank, is now 
one of the core elements of land access and reform research and policy formation 
amongst international organizations.  
 
The emergence of market assisted land reform theory is related to two phenomena:  the 
perception that traditional agrarian reform and colonization, both implemented by the 
State, have failed; and secondly the change in productive paradigms towards neoliberal 
theory that reduces the role of the State to a minimum, substituting the State with the 
market where possible. Application of this neoliberal economic theory in developing 
countries  is applied through structural adjustment policies. 
 
According to this hypothesis, market forces function and once restrictions that affect the 
land market are removed; this resource will be assigned according to its most 
appropriate use, as defined by the market.  
 
The principle elements defining market assisted land reform are the following: transfers 
are voluntary, are based on identifying land that is attractive to beneficiaries, this means 
that the beneficiaries are responsible for selecting the land and negotiating the price 
whilst the government just mediates the negotiations between the purchaser and vender. 
Land reform focuses on regions with surplus land, thus avoiding increased land prices.  
 
Agencies have diverse roles such as assisting to determine the correct price for the sale 
of land and proposing subsidiaries. They also assist beneficiaries in developing 
productive projects and promote their competitive advantage through capacity building, 
technical assistance and access to credit and markets. Implementation is decentralized 
and the majority of services provided for beneficiaries are presented by the private 
sector.  Therefore the role of the government is limited to providing credit and/or 
donations and establishing a decentralized market for land. The State does not 
administer of the whole process. Removing the State from the selection and negotiation 
                                                 
6 Riad El-Ghonemy, 1999; Banerjee Abjihit, 1999; Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas, 2000; Carlos Felipe Jaramillo, 1998; 
Melmed-Sanjak, 1998. 
of land eliminates inefficiencies, reduces administrative costs and the possibility of 
corruption.  
 
There are no explicit objectives for the distribution of land that could eventually be 
achieved and no defined timeframe.  
 
The basic condition required in order for “market assisted land reform” to be successful 
is a land market that functions. For the market to function the following conditions are 
required: 
 
1. Factors that stimulate investment:  
 
a. Clearly defined and legally recognized Property Rights  
b. Institutional framework necessary to guarantee protection of these rights 
c. Improved integration between the land market and other markets 
(particularly the financial market) 
d. Technical assistance. 
 
2. Factors that prevent distortion of land prices and unproductivity: 
 
a. Elimination of sectorial incentives (tax advantages, credit, subsidiaries 
etc) 
b. Land taxes 
c. Macroeconomic stability which prevents landholding motivated by 
investment  and speculation 
d. The volume of land for sale is greater than the demand 
 
3. Other factors that strengthen market functions: 
 
a. Market information systems 




















The land market diagram 
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An analysis of the Guatemalan Peace Accords identifies major similarities with the 
proposal for “market assisted land reform”. The only difference is the demand for 
recuperation of land fraudulently given to the military and the politics of the Franja 
Transversal del Norte and the Petén (FTN).7  This situation leads one to believe that it is 
precisely the “market assisted land reform” approach that was imposed during the 
negotiations of the Peace Accords and afterwards in signing the Accord on Socio-
Economic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation. The Peace Accords propose that the land 
market functions as the central mechanism for promoting transformation of 
landholdings and increased efficiency and productivity.  Proposals for the land market 
include; strengthening of property rights (regulation policies), registration and a 
Cadastre, implementation of taxes, improvement of financial mechanisms to facilitate 
access to land (land purchase), technical assistance and capacity building, 
complimentary social and economic investment, as well as protection of the 
environment.  
 
Despite coinciding with the neoliberal proposal, these measures have not been fully 
implemented. Activities related to the proposals that have been implemented have been 
                                                 
7 Ibid, III. Situación Agraria y Desarrollo Rural. La Franja Transversal del Norte includes all of the lower 
northern part of the country, from the department of Huehuetenango to Izabal, passing through Quiché 
and Alta Verapaz. 
isolated.  This is to say that the PAN Government, which signed the Socio-Economics 
Accord, did not even demonstrate any interest in executing the neoliberal measures of 
the Accord on Socio-Economic Aspects and the Agrarian Situation. This leads to the 
conclusion that PAN interests correspond to an even more conservative position than 
that presented in the Accord. Therefore the creation of the Fondo de Tierras remains an 
isolated measure, developed outside the context required to ensure success. 
 
Table 1 
Peace Accords and the Land Market 
The Peace Accords Land Market 
Access to land ownership: land trust fund 
The land trust fund will have prime responsibility for the 
acquisition of land through Government funding, will promote the 
establishment of a transparent land market and will facilitate the 
updating of land development plans. 
Access to land via the market. 
Access to land: funding mechanisms 
Promote, through all means possible, the development of a 
dynamic land market that would enable tenant farmers who either 
do not have land or have insufficient land to acquire land through 
long-term transactions at commercial or favorable interest rates 
with little or no down payment. 
There is no contradiction with 
the market, which also indicates 
the need for subsidies and/or 
credit mechanisms for land 
purchase.  
Productive projects: Develop sustainable productive projects 
especially geared towards boosting productivity and the 
processing of agricultural, forestry and fishery products in the 
poorest areas of the country.  
The market approach also 
focuses on productivity.  
Basic Infrastructure:  
Engage in judicious public investment and foster a climate 
conducive to private investment with a view to upgrading the 
infrastructure available for sustainable production and marketing, 
especially in areas of poverty and extreme poverty; 
Develop a rural development investment program with emphasis 
on basic infrastructure (highways, rural roads, electricity, 
telecommunications, water and environmental sanitation) and 
productive projects. 
Social and Economic 
investment.  Specific promotion 
of private investment. Create 
additional infrastructure 
required. 
Training and technical assistance:  
Strengthen, decentralize and broaden the coverage of training 
programs, especially programs designed to enhance rural people's 
managerial skills at various levels. The private sector and non-
governmental organizations will be enlisted in the implementation 
of this action; 
Develop technical assistance and job training programs that will 
upgrade the skills, versatility and productivity of the labor force in 
rural areas. 
Strengthening of capacity 
building systems. Opportunities 
should be opened for the 
transfer of government 
functions to the private sector 
(preparation of projects and 
technical assistance). 
Information: Develop an information collection, compilation and 
distribution system for the agriculture, forestry, food processing 
and fisheries sectors, one that will provide small producers with 
reliable information on which to base their decisions relating to 
seeds, inputs, crops, costs and marketing. 
Strengthening of information 
systems and capacity building. 
Legal Reform:  Promote a legal reform which will establish a 
juridical framework governing land ownership that is secure, 
simple and accessible to the entire population. This reform will 
need to simplify the procedures for awarding title and registering 
ownership and other real estate rights, as well as to simplify 
administrative and judicial formalities and procedures. 
Legal law and order. 
Regulation of land ownership, 
titling, strengthening of 
property rights and reduction of 
transaction costs. Territorial 
law and order. Assigning 
Promote the establishment of an agrarian and environmental 
jurisdiction within the judiciary through the enactment of the 
relevant legislation by the Congress. 
property rights through land 
ownership regulation projects. 
Conflict resolution: By 1997, to have started the operations of a 
Presidential office for legal assistance and conflict resolution in 
relation to land, with nationwide coverage and the task of 
providing advice and legal assistance to small farmers and 
agricultural workers with a view to the full exercise of their rights.
 
Land Register: By 1997, to have started the operations of a 
Presidential office for legal assistance and conflict resolution in 
relation to land, with nationwide coverage and the task of 
providing advice and legal assistance to small farmers and 
agricultural workers with a view to the full exercise of their rights. 
Likewise, the Government undertakes to initiate, by January 1997 
at the latest, the process of land surveying and systematizing the 
land register information.  
Strengthening of the institutions 
that assist the land market 
(registration, land office, 
judicial bodies and policies). 
Establish a register and 
trustworthy  land office that 
offers legal certainty and 
property stability.  
Land tax: Promoting, by 1997, the legislation and mechanisms for 
the application, in consultation with municipalities, of a land tax 
in the rural areas from which it is easy for the municipalities to 
collect revenues. The tax, from which small properties will be 
exempt, will help to discourage ownership of undeveloped land 
and underutilization of land. Taken as a whole, these mechanisms 
ought not to encourage deforestation of land use for forestry; 
Establishing a new tax schedule for the annual tax on undeveloped 
land which imposes significantly higher taxes on privately owned 
unutilized and/or underutilized land. 
Land taxes should be 
established that provide 




2. FONDO DE TIERRAS IN GUATEMALA 
 
Fondo de Tierras (FONTIERRAS) in Guatemala is an autonomous decentralized State 
body, formed by the Peace Accords with national scope and authority, is legally 
registered and has its own resources.  
 
The creation of Fondo de Tierras has received significant support from the World Bank 
even though the loan granted to Guatemala designed to assist FONTIERRAS was not 
approved until April 2000. The World Bank states that this project “will assist the 
Government initiative to implement market assisted land reform.”.8 
 
Fondo de Tierras has two principal functions: regulation and granting credit for land 
purchase. This study focuses on the second function as the only land access mechanism 
in Guatemala. 
 
Since its beginning on 15th October, 2001, 9,874 families have received 54,611.94 
hectares and a total of US $ 42,821,7829 in credit and US $ 20,427,1779  in subsidiaries.  
To date the total amount invested in technical assistance is US $ 2,783,41010 
 
The total number of applications received by Fondo de Tierras stands at 747. One-
hundred and thirty-three credit programs have been granted, whilst 11 credit programs 
                                                 
8 Guatemala-Fondo de Tierras Project, November 1997. 
9 Exchange rate of 7.8 Quetzals to the US$. 
10 Information Area of FONTIERRAS, properties granted at 5/10/2001. 
are about to be granted. Two-hundred and seven cases have been closed. Fifty-seven 
cases remain inactive and/or are classified as difficult. Therefore 339 cases are being 
processed as normal.  The cost of the credit program for the 339 cases will reach US $ 
115,467,824 and the subsidiaries will reach US $ 52,538,295. This means that a total of 
US $ 168,031,927 is required just to meet the demands of the normal cases, without 
taking into consideration operational costs.  
 
Of the cases that have been closed,  95% did not continue the process, in 4% of the 
cases the group disintegrated and in 1% of cases they were attended to by FONAPAZ. 
A high percentage of the groups did not continue the process because of excessive 
procedures (around 30), which  is not manageable for groups who do not have 
organizational assistance. Other reasons for not continuing the process include: not 
meeting the family quota, the landholder withdraws their offer and no other offer is 
made, or the group can not reach agreement amongst themselves – particularly when the 
group consists of people from different communities.11 
 
Of the 57 cases that are inactive or classified as very difficult, the majority presented 
incomplete documents, which delays the process. This is caused by the very same 
factors mentioned in the previous paragraph.  
 
 
3. CONCLUSIONS ON THE LAND MARKET IN GUATEMALA 
 
Taking into consideration the conditions previously discussed that should exist in the 
land market for the “market assisted land reform” model to function, it is evident that 
the following limitations exist: 
 
Clearly defined and legally recognised property rights 
 
The lack of legal certainty on  property ownership, the level of distrust in the property 
register, the non existence of a Cadastre present serious limitations in the land market. 
The study identified three farms that have problems with boundary disputes and as such 
do not have legal registration.  “For example in the Petén, all of the farms are 
subdivisions of two larger farms, thus it must be determined who is the property 
holder....Without a Cadastre there is no legal guarantee  for the purchase of land, 
registering the land provides some security but there is no definite security. There are 
problems and there will be more problems....”12 
  
Institutional framework to garrantee protection of those rights 
 
With the signing of the Peace Accords, there was an attempt to develop State policy to 
promote institutional changes required for land issues, through the “Herradura”13. 
However with the new government and more specifically its first Minister for 
Agriculture (who held this office for six months), all of the institutional changes 
                                                 
11 Interview Gilberto Atz, 28th February 2002. 
12 Interview with Sergio Mollinedo, September 2001. 
13 Herradura: the Peace Accords tried to establish a State development policy for land issues, through a concept called the 
Herradura, which included: Geographical Information System (IGN), Land Register and Cadastre (RIC), the Presidential Office for  
the Resolution of Land Conflicts (CONTIERRA), Fondo de Tierras (FONTIERRAS), Land tax and taxes on idle land and 
investment for Productive Agricultural Development and Rural Development.  
developed by the Peace Accords were dismantled. This indicates the fragility of the 
institutional structure that had been implemented.14  
 
Improved intergration between the land market and other markets (in particular the 
financial sector) 
 
The deficiency in monetary policies, exchange rates and credit which stimulates 
savings, investment within both the medium and short term has reduced the availability 
of resources for production. Neither the financial system nor the national bank have 
policies in favor of rural credit, with the exception of BANRURAL; the cooperatives 
sector and some non-government organizations play an important role in financing the 
rural area.  
 
For Fondo de Tierras beneficiaries the deficiency in access to credit implies that they 
are unable to obtain basic services and infrastructure. The subsidary is not sufficient to 




Technical assistance came under the previous Public Agricultural Sector mandate, 
however when this office was dismantled in accordance with the social adjustment 
policy, there remained a vacuum that neither the State nor the private sector has 
addressed. With the exception of Fondo de Tierras beneficiaries, Guatemalan 
campesino farmers do not receive technical assistance. The omission of technical 
assistance implies that land is not being used in the most productive manner and there is 
no strategy for territorial organization. Both factors affect the land market.  
 
Problems faced by the Fondo de Tierras in providing concrete technical assistance were 
evident in the study.  In summary it can be stated that the private sector providing 
technical assistance does not adequately address training and capacity building needs of 
beneficiaries. Capacity building is required in identifying land, negotiation, awareness 
and understanding of credit conditions etc. The fact that this social service has been 
privatized has presented other problems, such as:  
 
- Failure to complete duties: because the technical assistance is provided by the 
private sector, rather than being addressed as a social issue it is approached from 
a business perspective. The purpose of many businesses is not to solve a specific 
problem but to achieve the most economic benefit with the least economic cost. 
This implies that less personnel are contracted than the number specified in the 
contracts, that the personnel spend less time in the communities and do not have 
the necessary qualifications. These problems have been evident in field work.  
- Corruption: as previously mentioned, private sector technical assistance 
contracts have been subject to various criticisms as it seems that Fondo de 
Tierras officials are involved in the “business” of contracting.  
 
Elimination of sectorial incentives (tax advantages, credit, susideries etc.) 
 
                                                 
14 Interview with Carlos Cabrera, UTJ, 4th July 2001. 
The Guatemalan economy is affected by a combination of privileges or false incentives 
exonerations, exceptions and deductions that distort efficient allocation of resources. 
“There are fiscal privileges at the Constitutional level for private schools as well as 
individuals and legal firms that make donations to the universities, cultural or scientific 
entities. Such donations are deducted from the total rent sum calculated for the rent tax 
- ISR.  Fiscal privileges and in some cases exemption of duty taxes, ISR, Value Added 
Tax - IVA and the property tax – IUSI, are awarded to certain productive sectors. 
Productive sectors, such as the clothing industry, businesses located in the free trade 
zones, the energy industry and sugar refineries amongst others, receive fiscal privileges 




“The Only Tax on Property (IUSI in Spanish), is practically insignificant, in 1990 it 
reached 48.4 million Quetzales which is 0.13% of Gross Domestic Product. In 2000 a 
reaudit calculated another 7.5 million Quetzales, equivalent of 0.01%  of the Gross 
Domestic Product. The total loss of registration of IUSI funds collected has been a 
consequence of Fiscal decentralization that accelerated after 1998, protests against the 
new tax, overturning of the tax and consequently implementation of the previous tax. All 
of which has caused a collapse in collection and calculation of the total amount of 
income generated by the tax.”16. 
 
The Guatemalan IUSI tax  is politically a very sensitive tax and there have been very 
tense discussions related to implementation.  The later is due to the unequal distribution 
of land within the country. In this sense, despite the reduced efficiency in terms of 
generating tax income, this law is politically important for land reform. The Repeal of 
the IUSI Law has eliminated any possibility of taxing idle lands, as there is now no 
legislation that contains such a tax.  
 
Macroeconomic Stability required to prevent  investment and speculation landholding 
Macroeconomic stability creates secure context for economic agents, who provide a 
more dynamic formal land market. In Guatemala the principle limiting factor in this 
sense has been the high interest rates and the restriction of credit.17 Macroeconomic 
stability is not the same as stability in prices, there is no macroeconomic stability if 
there is no increase in the Gross Domestic Product and employment generation.  
 
The existence of sectarian incentives, economic instability and lack of land taxes causes 
repercussions for Fondo de Tierras operations. The main repercussion is that the land 
prices are distorted by speculation and do not represent land productivity. 
 
Guarantee that land supply is greater than demand 
 
This study estimates that there are currently 316,000 families seeking land.   
 
There does not exist sufficient public property or vacant land to create land reserves to 
meet this demand, therefore the State can not be considered as the land supplier.18  
Private supply is very dependant on incentives to sell, which in Guatemala are very low 
                                                 
15 Maynor Cabrera y Carlos Barreda, 2001. 
16 Cabrera y Barreda, op. cit. 
17 Carrera, 1999. 
18 Ibid. 
due to the macroeconomic instability and the lack of taxes. In this sense the private 
supply of good quality land is very limited, which causes disequilibrium between supply 
and demand.    
 
This study found that groups have to invest significant time just to find suitable land.  
This illustrates that supply is scarce in comparison to demand, even through the real 
demand for land in Guatemala is not fully represented.  Land that is easy to access and 
on the list of land offers at Fondo de Tierras is poor quality land, thus the fundamental 
conditions necessary for the land market to function do not exist.  
 
Market information systems 
 
Even though the Accord for the Resettlement of Refugee Communities establishes the 
need for a study on land supply in order to meet demand, such a study was never 
undertaken.19   
 
Rural Infrastructure and basic services 
 
State investment in infrastructure development programs, provision of services and 
withdrawal of services all affect the land market. Despite having constructed roads and 
increased the electrical service, the country still lacks vital infrastructure in 
telecommunications and electrical energy (24.6% of the rural population in 1998), clean 
drinking water (24.7% of the population in rural areas in 1998), health services and 
education, especially in rural areas. This factor along with the lack of rural 
infrastructure (markets, irrigation etc.) means that properties are extremely 
heterogeneous, another element that distorts land prices.  Thus prices are not defined 
solely by the profitability of the land but rather by the accessibility of the land, location 
in respect to principle agricultural product markets, the availability of water for 
irrigation and the internal and external infrastructure of the property.  Only after 
considering all of these factors,  the productivity and size of the property are taken into 
consideration.  
 
Precarious social services were a major characteristic of many of the communities 
visited during this study. The main problem after establishing a market for their 
products is the poor accessibility of the land. Furthermore the majority of communities 
visited did not have formal living structures, clinics, drinking water or electricity.  
 
Analyzing the factors that influence the land market it is apparent that practically none 
of the factors required to establish a functioning land market are present and that the 
land market in Guatemala is non-existent. “In the case of Guatemala it is utopian to 
think that land reform can be achieved through the market”20. However Fondo de 
Tierras represents “market assisted land reform” and is confident that the market will 
solve the problem of unequal distribution of land. This proves that international finance 
organizations do not take into consideration local factors when implementing and 
promoting their policies.  
 
Another aspect that draws attention to this factor is the market model established in the 
Peace Accords. It can be seen that in the name of peace, market mechanisms are being 
                                                 
19 Entrevista Laura Hurtado, 18 de mayo del 2001. 
20 Carlos Caberea. 
implemented by international organizations in the same manner as applied to other 
developing countries. This means that Guatemalan characteristics related to the peace 
process disappear within the normal common development model.  
 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS ON THE FUNCTION OF THE FONDO DE 
TIERRAS 
 
a. Bureaucracy: The process required for submitting a complete land application 
presents several difficulties. The beneficiaries have to invest a significant 
amount of time and economic resources in searching for land that meets Fondo 
de Tierras requirements. This situation prevents groups with limited economic 
resources from continuing their application. The process itself is bureaucratic 
and complicated. This in turn creates an automatic elimination process of groups 
that do not have the necessary education level, experience or assistance of a 
campesino organization. Furthermore, it is becoming more and more 
bureaucratic in an attempt to hide the financial inability of Fondo de Tierras to 
met very concrete demand. The average time required to accept and process an 
application and grant credit has increased from 13 months in 1998 to 24.5 
months in 2001.  
 
Table 2 
Number of months from initial application to granting of credit 
Period Farms granted Quarterly average Annual average 
1998 jan-june 3 2.94  
1998 july-dec 10 16.00 12.99 
1999 jan-june 3 16.73  
1999 july-dec 14 14.96 15.27 
2000 jan-june 4 16.25  
2000 july-dec 41 20.39 20.03 
2001 jan-june 36 21.27  
2001 july-dec 23 24.33 22.46 
Source: Study material developed based on Fondo de Tierras data, Farms granted by December 2001. 
 
 
This highlights that market mechanisms do not solve the problem of bureaucracy, 
even though bureaucracy has been one of the main criticisms of traditional land 
reform with State intervention.  
 
b. Administrative abnormalities: It can be illustrated that market mechanisms do not 
necessarily solve this problem; to the contrary they perpetuate it.  It should be noted 
that contracting of private entities could be distorted and misused, if it is not done so 
according to established guidelines.21 
 
 
                                                 
21 Irregularities in Fondo de Tierras: During the research interviewees highlighted several cases of corruption: 
• The existence of technical assistance businesses that are owned by Fondo de Tierras officials and employees, whose services 
are imposed on the beneficiaries. 
• A network between assistance organizations, landowners, officials of CONTIERRA and FONTIERRAS to ensure their own 
benefit from the purchase of land. 
• Abnormalities in the property valuation and intermediaries who charge a commission and are related to Fondo de Tierras 
officials. 
c. Loopholes and bad practice in the identification and selection of beneficiaries: 
 
- In practice the groups that are assisted by  an organization or institution, in 
particular communities that are associates of CNOC, have increased possibility 
of accessing Fondo de Tierras in a shorter timeframe.  
- In several cases the selection of beneficiaries by the Socioeconomic Area of 
Fondo de Tierras has not been thorough, given that on some of the properties 
there were people with stable economic resources, employment in urban areas 
and some even have profitable production of various crops in other communities 
and in other situations the communities had homes with all basic services. In this 
sense the Fondo de Tierras Law does not adequately define the target population 
as specified in the Peace Accords.  
- Enormous errors in selecting beneficiaries, absent beneficiaries,  adjudication to 
women due to the lack of qualifying men, displacement of past workers on the 
property and excessive numbers of beneficiaries add to the complications.22 
- There is a significant advantage (in terms of land quality and price, time required 
for the process etc) for groups that are assisted by an organization over those 
who begin the application process on their own.  
 
d. Granting poor quality properties:  
 
- The Fondo de Tierras property listing generally consists of poor quality 
properties. This suggests firstly that Fondo de Tierras gives landowners the 
opportunity to rid themselves of poor quality property or avoid paying 
indemnification of property workers, instead of providing real alternatives for 
campesinos without land.  
- Where good or reasonable quality properties were visited, the acquisition of 
such land was largely due to the active participation of the beneficiaries in 
searching for the property and the significant amount of time invested. One 
practice used by beneficiaries is to use an intermediary (see the following 
diagram), their payment being inclusion in the list of beneficiaries. There have 
also been cases of the exact opposite, in which the intermediaries are contracted 
by the property owners.  
 



















                                                 
22 Leopoldo Sandoval group discussion, 1st December 2001. 
 
e. Unequal negotiations: Due to a lack of capacity (as illustrated in the following 
diagram, only 20% of the groups surveyed were given capacity building by Fondo 
de Tierras) the groups have a disadvantage in negotiation. Unless they are assisted 
by an organization the groups enter into negotiations with no preparation and 
negotiation is unequal due to the higher education and experience of the landowners. 
FONTIERRAS gives the beneficiaries example prices, based on the property 
valuation and in this sense there is some intervention, so in some cases the outcome 
has been a good purchase price. However it is not very clear what role Fondo de 
Tierra really holds in negotiation.  
 













f. In many cases the application of a subsidiary is not decided by the beneficiaries: 
In 59% of the cases the groups did not participate in the application of the 
subsidiary.  As a result a limited amount of funds are allocated to food security and 
work capital.  
- Insufficient work capital can cause desertion of the property, seasonal migration, 
lack of motivation to organize and may prevent the implementation of 
productive projects. All of which mean that the beneficiaries will not be able to 
pay for the property, let alone generate income, save and achieve integrated 
sustainable development. 
- Insufficient subsidiary allocated to food security (this item includes transport 
and basic housing) delays and obstructs transport and the initiation of projects. 
The poor management of funds by the communities also affects funds allocated 
to food security and the reduction in these funds obviously causes other 
problems. 
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Debt payment Work capital Food security
 
 
g. Delays in repaying the subsidy: 41% of the groups mentioned delays in paying 
the subsidy. As a consequence productive projects are delayed. In the meantime the 
interest free term is calculated from the date the subsidy is received. Delays in 
repayments effects the groups economically. Subsidy delays have diminished 
however it continues to exist and affect beneficiary populations.  



















h. Desertion: The principal causes of desertion (refer to the following diagram) are 
the lack of basic essential services (water, housing, electricity, health and education 
services) and because the community does not believe they can pay for the property. 
 








i. Lack of information about credit conditions: Information concerning debt, interest, 
terms and the interest free period is generally only managed by members of the 
Board of Directors of the groups, although in many cases even they are not 
informed. This lack of formation and clarity concerning the terms and conditions of 
the debt illustrates inefficient capacity building and awareness raising by Fondo de 
Tierras.  There is confusion about the debt (35.3% were not sure of the total sum), 
the terms (45.8% did not have exact information), interest (47.3% did not have exact 
information about interest) etc. On the other hand these figures show that the groups 
are mainly interested in obtaining immediate access to land and not in the purchase 
conditions. 
 

































j. Weaknesses in productive project studies:  
o Technical assistance firms undertaking feasibility studies of productive 
projects, without even reading previous feasibility studies previously 
undertaken by independent consultants are duplicating workload and 
resources. 
o The groups do not participate in the planning of productive projects 
(48% of the groups mentioned that they had not participated). 
 















o The major difficulty faced by productive initiatives is the lack of markets 
and uncertainty in produce prices. This fact is not adequately addressed 




k. Unprofitable productive projects: 
 
o Productive projects have not been profitable in the majority of the 
properties. This is mainly due to inadequate technical assistance, lack of 
sufficient capital for the project or the lack of markets and stable prices. 
o The development of productive projects is limited by minimal resources 
for food security and work capital, the lack of basic services, desertion 
and delays in reception of subsidiaries and technical assistance. These 
factors, along with poor quality land and property location further 
contribute to deterioration in the feasibility of the productive projects.  
 
l. Lack of markets and commercialization channels:  In 56% of the groups surveyed 
no market exists. 








There is market for the
products
There does not exist
market for the products
 
m. Food Security: The majority of projects implemented in the properties are basic 
grains, followed by vegetables and livestock. Very few properties have implemented 
fruit or reforestation projects. However FONTIERRAS tries to make communities 
“aware of” the advantages of commercial production (domestic or  export), for a 
doubtful market, before producing basic grains. Thus endangering community food 
security.  
 
n. Problems in selecting technical assistance firms and their practice: 
 
- In general groups have not participated in the selection of the technical 
assistance firms, rather FONTIERRAS alone has selected and imposed the 
technical assistance firm (89% of the groups surveyed did NOT participate in 
the selection of the firm). This affects the technical assistance contract and 
practice. In 62% of cases the groups were not aware of the contract conditions 
between Fondo de Tierra and the technical assistance firms. 
- There is no standard methodology for the presentation of technical assistance 
services. Some firms have an agricultural technician permanently based at the 
property, others visit for a week each month and yet others only make one visit a 
month.  Furthermore all claim to use the “learning through practice” strategy. 
With the introduction of new technological kits and crops, this strategy becomes 
“learning from your losses”. This causes grave economic loses for the 
campesinos, distrust in new technology and resistance to change, which is lethal 
for the beginnings of the development process. They try to transform subsistence 
farmers into commercial producers within one single agricultural cycle. What is 
more likely to occur is the transformation into subsistence farmers, who are even 
poorer than before, given that they now have bank debts. 
-  The technical assistants employed by the firms do not speak the Mayan 
languages spoken in different regions. This presents serious problems in 
communication, transfer of knowledge and capacity building for the 
beneficiaries.  
- The technical assistance focuses only on agricultural and forestry production and 
is not directed towards integrated development. The largest deficiency exists in 
the lack of capacity building in organization and in the production and 
marketing processes. Without organization there is no development and even 
less integrated rural development. 
- Fondo de Tierras has practically no supervision over the work undertaken by the 
technical assistance firms, which implies that the private firms practically have 
total autonomy and there is no control of the nature and fulfillment of their 
contract. This is dangerous given that many of the firms selected by Fondo de 
Tierras do not have a real commitment to the communities but rather function 
according to business transaction ethics (as would any other business) and not 
for social benefit. Furthermore there are two properties (two of those surveyed) 
that currently do not have any technical assistance.  
- Beneficiary communities are unable to pay for a part of the technical assistance 
after the second year (in 100% of cases) as established in the Fontierras Law. 
This means that the presence of the private firm decreases, there is less 
accompaniment and less successful production.  
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o.Debt payment:  Some of the beneficiary communities are able to pay for the 
property but this alone does not garrantee that they obtain integrated 
development, especially given that there is a tendency to subdivide the property 
once the debt has been paid. Even when they are able to pay the for the property 
with the subsidary, the properties are generally such poor quality that 
productivity and/or marketing of products is unachievable. For this reason the 
communities can not break free from poverty.  There are very few groups for 
whom intergral development can become reality. 
 


















p. Inadequate attention to gender equity:  
o The organizational structure is centralist and male dominated. The 
administration, community needs and interests as well as decision 
making related to these issues are recognized as men’s rights. This is 
further illustrated in the Junta Directiva in the communities, which 
consist only of men. During the organizational assemblies women’s 
participation is restricted to listening, they do not have the right to vote 
or to have their voices heard. 
o Women’s training has been limited to registration of Women’s 
Committees.  There has been no permanent or consistent community 
awareness raising processes that stimulate organization and women’s 
participation.  
o Institutional recognition of women’s rights by FONTIERRRAS and the 
private capacity building firms is evident only in discourse and theory, in 
practice attitudes and processes reflect that women’s rights are not seen 
as important elements in project implementation. 
  
Many of the problems experienced by FONTIERRAS in Guatemala coincide with 
problems experienced in other countries where market assisted land reform policies 
have been implemented.  This confirms that the difficulties experienced are not specific 
but rather structural and inherent to the model that does not provide an adequate 
solution to problems faced in the countries where it has been implemented. Examples of 
coincidences are: 
- Priority for the beneficiaries is accessing land and not the price of land23 
- The beneficiaries do not have real negotiating power24 
- Lack of real participation of the beneficiaries25 
- Deficit in land offers  not enough quality land available26 
- Program focused on efficiency and not equity (the programs are designed for 
campesinos who already have some productive experience and can illustrate that they 
are capable of implementing an economically viable project)27 
- Bureaucracy in the agencies responsible for land reform28  
 
 
Based on the FONTIERRAS budget, present and possible impact and the current 
conditions in which FONTIERRAS operates, FONTIERRAS has no mayor influence in 
increasing access to land.  Even though the implementation of Fondo de Garantías 
would create more impact, taking into account annual budget appreciation for the next 
two years, the impact on land purchases would be insignificant. Without Fondo de 
Garantías, study findings show that in the year 2006 only 1.16 % of demand (created by 
demand from people who do not have access to land, those who do have access or own 
less than 436.8 square meters29) will be met.  
 
With Fondo de Garantías over the next few years, between 1.80 % and 2.0% of the 
demand would be met30. At the same time population increases31 will cause demand for 
                                                 
23 Schwartzman, 2000. 
24 Ibid 
25 FIAN, Vía Campesina, 2000. 
26 El-Ghonemy, 1998; Tom Lebert, 2000. 
27 FIAN, Vía Campesina, op. cit. 
28 Kilusang, 2000.;  Schwartzmann, op.cit.; El-Ghonemy, op. cit. 
29 Una cuerda: measurement of land commonly used in Guatemala, equivalent of 436.8 meters squared. 
30 Consists of the campesino population who do not have access to land, have access or ownership of land that is less 
than una cuerda. 
31 Annual population increase is estimated at 2.51%.  
 
land to continue rising every year.  Therefore it is not possible to achieve changes in 
landholdings structure necessary for “land reform”.  
 
Table 3 
Impact of FONTIERRAS, per thousand 




% covered Deficit 
1979 181.40 0.00 0.00 181.40
1998 290.53 1.09 0.38 289.44
1999 297.83 7.29 1.32 0.44 296.51
2000 305.30 7.48 2.58 0.85 302.72
2001 312.96 7.66 4.89 1.56 308.08
2002 320.82 7.86 4.50 1.40 316.32
2003 328.87 8.05 6.57 2.00 322.30
2004 337.13 8.25 6.66 1.98 330.47
2005 345.59 8.46 6.96 2.02 338.62
2006 354.26 8.67 6.38 1.80 347.88
Source: Study calculations based on The National Agrarian Census 1979 and the National 
Population Census 1980, United Nations Human Development Report 2000. 
 
 
5. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
Apart from the concret functional problems faced by Fondo de Tierras, there are two 
structural problems, addressed previously, that restrict impact; the budget available and 
the lack of conditions necessary  for a functional land market, in particular limited 
suppply. 
 
World Bank officials are aware of the structural limitations that exist in practically all 
devleoping countries in relation to the creation of land markets and the real possibilities 
of successful “market assited land reform“.  They maintain that “the proposal of “land 
reform from the communities”is complemnentary to other propsosals, it does not 
subsitute the laws that enable the State to expropriate land that has been (and in some 
countries continues to be) an important instrument to break the resistance of large 
landholders....” and that “we are very aware that global recipies do not exist rather 
that the proposal applied in any country must be adapted specifically according to local 
conditions. ”.32 
 
Dispite this awareness, the “market assisted land reform“ model remains the preferred 
option and local characteristics have not been taken into consideration (the post-war 
process in Guatemala and the lack of conditions that determine the funcion of land 
markets). In terms of prioritizing the beneficiaries, it is bought to attention that contrary 
to the declaration of the Socio-economic Area of Fondo de Tierras, the World Bank 
maintains that demobilized popoulations should not  be given priority. This is a further 
contradition given that the World Bank has a division (“Post-conflict Peacebuilding & 
Reconstruction Unit”) that works within the thematic framework of demobilization and 
intergration of demobilized populations, specifically because in the post-conflict 
environment this group has been identified as a key factor in establishing minimal 
security and preventing the return  of conflict. In this sense it can be seen (on behalf of 
the World Bank) that the World Bank continues to work within a post-conflict context 
                                                 
32 Robert L.Thompson, Director Rural Development Department of the World Bank, in a letter addressed to Rafael Alegría de la Vía 
Campesina, responding to a “call for land reform”, 18 of January del 2001. 
as if it were a normal common development process, skipping the particular 
charactersitics of the Peace Process (and in particular the Peace Accords). 
 
Civil society criticisms are considered “ideological“33. One reaction to these criticisms 
was to change the name of the model from “market assisted land reform“ to “land 
reform administered by the comnunities“.34 This new term does not change the context 
nor the scope of the model, it simply aims to remove the ideology behind the model and 
highlight the participative aspect. 
 
The participative aspect presents an interesting focus if and when it is managed within 
the specific context. This is to say that it is taken into account that in reality the majority 
of the population have very scarce access to education levels that would enable them to 
participate equally in the market. According to the principal World Bank expert on land 
reform, Klaus Deininger, in Colombia a program has been implemented in which the 
municipal rural populations received six months capacitation, before begining the 
selection and negotiation process. This strategy strengthens demand and liberates the 
population of the previously exisitng State paternalism.35  
 
What is not clear is how the World Bank seeks to solve the problem of limited supply. It 
is obvious that in this situation much stronger intervention of the State is required. Not 
only to continue advances in the Peace Accords mechanisms identified to strengthen the 
market (Cadastre, registration and regulation) but to also to recuperate lands that were 
illegally granted, without fearing expropriations (although these are compensated). By 
any other means  it would be impossible to break the feudal structure that exists in 
Guatemala, especially given that the market, in niether the long nor short term, offers 
incentives to sell unproductive land and even less incentive for redistribution of 
productive land.   
 
Finally, a rural development strategy should encompass more than just access to land. 
On the one hand it is necessary to strengthen the State institutions (Cadastre, property 
register etc), on the other hand the State must invest in the rural areas. In particular: 
rural and social infrastructure, with an emphasis in capcacity building and education for 
rural communities, specifically capacity builidng in organization.36. Such measures call 
for a strong and active State, that should not leave a space to the market that, at least in 











                                                 
33 Group discussion with World Bank experts, 3 July 2001. 
34 World Bank, 2001 
35 Interview with Klaus Deininger, 3 July  2001. 
36 See UNDP, 2000: „poverty reduction is based on poor people organizing themsleves in commuities, this is the best 
antidote against the lack of power, a basic source of poverty. Once organized, poor communities can influence local 
Government...they can also form wider alliances in order to influence decisions in regional and national planning. 




This study clearly shows the operational and budetary limits of Fondo de Tierras in 
addressing demand for land, it also highlights specific structural characteristics that 
demonstrate the infeasibility of the market justifying the unequal distribution of land in 
Guatemala.  
 
The study recognizes the need for the State to take a stronger position, which should 
include several additional mechanisms in order to facilitate access to land apart from the 
purchase of land through FONTIERRAS. One important factor is the recuperation of 
land that has been illegally granted, as highlighted in the Peace Accords. This would 
strengthen supply, as would the application of inheritance taxes, property taxes and 
taxes on idle lands.  These measures would deter large property holdings and promote 
land sales. Nevertheless, it is necessary to explore and further study different 
mechanisms that could broaden the impact of modifications to the current highly 
concentrated structure of land holdings. The later leaves no doubt of the need to 
improve not only the operational functions of Fondo de Tierras, with the aim of 
achieving a better impact, but also the need to further study the additional mechanisms 
for access to land as well as the development of a State policy for rural development, 
that addresses the agrarian and rural problems in Guatemala with an integrated 
approach.  
 
The Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas CNOC (National 
Coordinator of Campesino Organizations) presented a proposal of diverse options for 
access to land, as an alternative to addressing the problematic structural injustice of land 
ownership in Guatemala.  This proposal needs to be further studied and developed 
before implementation, to ensure that specific characteristics of land reform in the 
country are not overlooked.  Options proposed include access to compensation for 
groups whose land was illegally taken from them during the internal conflict, 
expropriation in accordance with Article 40 of the Constitution of the Republic, which 
permits the expropriation of private property for common collective use, social benefits 
and public interest properly controlled.  Labor compensation can be solicited on 
agricultural  or cattle properties where colonial serfs have worked more than ten years 
without receiving labor benefits or compensation. In this situation, if the landholders do 
not posses financial resources, they can pay with land;  access through conflict 
resolution37;  and through civilian or individual processes that exist in cases of the right 
of possession versus the right of landownership or for cases of double land titling.  
 
Apart from promoting alternative mediums for access, promotion of rural development 
strategy and access to land is urgently required. There are a series of initiatives from 
different sectors and social groups working towards the conception of a rural 
development and land policy. The same campesina organizations, the Catholic Church, 
research centers and non-government organizations, as well as the government and 
international organizations are working towards this goal.  
 
The diversity of proposals illustrates that a rural development strategy can not fail to 
include as transversal themes, Nation identity and in the long term, the multiethnic, 
                                                 
37 The most common conflicts are: incorrect land measurement, double land titling (property already registered is inscribed a 
second time, due to lack of information, poor location, inefficiency of the current register or corruption), and property rights versus 
ownership rights  
multilingual and pluricultural characteristics of the country, social participation, the 
need for a strong State that promotes development and dissemination of income equity, 
decentralization, and special attention to the marginalized and excluded, in particular 
the Indigenous and women.  
 
Objectives of the diverse proposals for a rural development strategy highlight the need 
for State strengthening so that the State is able to undertake the following 
responsibilities; Promote, orientate and regulate economic and social development, 
strengthening of an agrarian institution such as the Cadastre, property registration and 
application of property taxes, idle land taxes as well as the elimination of privileges, 
exemptions and exonerations. Re-establish the Public Agricultural Sector, basically in 
the areas of technical assistance and marketing; investment in rural and social 
infrastructure. Deliver free universal basic services and intensive promotion of 
productive investments. Restructuring of the primary exports model. Restructuring, 
diversification and modernization of the agricultural market, strengthening of the 
internal market  and agro industry. Promotion of exports, as well as a society that 
promotes respect, development and participation of Indigenous peoples, cultural 
diversity and the participation of women.  
 
The proposal recognizes Fondo de Tierras as one of the mechanisms for accessing land, 
however it is an insufficient mechanism, and recommends further improvement and the 
establishment of other complimentary options for access to land and rural development 
policies to achieve integrated development for men and women campesinos. The 
proposal addresses two elements: 1) the operation of Fondo de Tierras and 2) the Fondo 
de Tierras budget.  
 
 
1. IMPROVING FONDO DE TIERRAS OPERATIONS 
 
a. Property selection, negotiation and organization 
 
 Establish a Fondo de Tierras policy of accompaniment for beneficiary groups 
that are initiating their application process, assigning economic, human and 
material resources to ensure successful proceedings. 
  
 Accompaniment of the groups could be undertaken by campesino organizations 
via the Coordinadora Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas (CNOC). Fondo 
de Tierras and CNOC would jointly establish respective working agreements 
with detailed criteria on economic, technical and material support as well as 
capacity building38.  
 
 The role of the campesino organizations could be: organizational capacity 
building, ensuring authenticity and representation in the formation of groups, 
capacity building in negotiation, capacity building and formation in production, 
selection and negotiating the property (verifying the legal accreditation of the 
                                                 
38 CNOC accompaniment of groups initiating their  application should in principle follow three paths: establishing the quality of the 
property, assistance in property negotiation and assistance in selecting the technical assistance firm. CNOC or campesino 
organizations give accompaniment and assist the groups in what technical assistance entails, what activities the technical assistance 
firms should complete and criteria by which to select such firms. 
 
land, demanding a registration map and a thorough inspection of the property), 
and the integration of beneficiaries documentation. 
 
 Awareness raising should be undertaken with both men and women, so as to 
ensure participation of women in the community groups formed. Discriminatory 
practices and attitudes regarding women’s participation should be overcome 
when identifying land and in the negotiation process.   
 
 A less exclusive, masculine and vertical approach to community organization 
should be promoted. An approach that is oriented towards improving access to 
land, to organizational structure and decision making within the community for 
women should be adopted. This approach should also promote participation of 
women and practical recognition of women’s rights within the community.  
 
 It is also necessary that the person responsible for ensuring women’s 
participation and organization is female and has experience in working with a 
gender perspective. 
 
 Improved mechanisms for ensuring authenticity and representation of 
beneficiary groups, with the aim of eliminating individuals with economic 
resources and employment in urban areas from benefiting and affecting the 
integration and development of the group.  Ensuring authenticity and 
representation of the groups should be coordinated between the Socioeconomic 
Area of Fondo de Tierras and the campesino organizations represented in 
CNOC.  Criteria should include: 
 
e. To guarantee the selection of the poorest of the poor, reduce the 
maximum amount for qualification as a beneficiary to two minimum 
salaries.  
f. To guarantee group cohesion and avoid desertation; clarify that the land 
is purchased and must be paid for, use bilingual personal and strengthen 
organizational processes through accompanying organizations; guarantee 
the formation of co-operatives, associations or campesino businesses.  
 
 Priority should be given to the following groups: women (widows), displaced 
and demobilized populations. A part from these groups, cases should be 
processed according to the date of submission.  
 
 Define a policy for the purchase of properties in accordance with the potential 
agricultural and forestry productivity and that does not accept the purchase of 
poor quality land. Land selection comes under the responsibilities of the 
accompanying organization (CNOC).  
 
 The “capacity building” in negotiation currently offered as a formation activity 
should be restructured as a formation process that guarantees the ability of the 
beneficiaries in successful negotiating. This capacity building should also create 
awareness of the property value and not just seeing the negotiation as an 
opportunity to purchase land. Capacity building falls under the responsibilities 
of the accompanying organization (CNOC). 
 
 The beneficiaries should be aware of and understand the property valuation.39. 
 
b. Property Valuations 
 
 Improve and increase transparency of valuation procedures, in order to 
prevent over valuing and determine one standard methodology. Valuations 
could be undertaken by one firm or institution (BANRURAL40 or the 
Department of Property Valuations (DICABI in Spanish) within the Ministry 
of Public Finances). 
 
 Professionals who undertake valuations should present their conclusions 
under a legally binding oath, swearing that the description, explanation and 
conclusions of their reports are true and that they do not have any legal 
conflicts of interest or obstacles preventing them from undertaking the 
valuation and will not delegate or subcontract other firms or individual 
valuers for activities specified in respective contracts. 
 
 Approval of the valuation should be conducted in the presence of the 
potential beneficiaries, accompanying organizations and the technical 
assistance firm. The format, methodology and contents of the valuation 
should be defined in a manner that facilitates evaluation and/or verification. 
Independent consultants should undertake the audit or financial review of the 
valuation and define a system of financial indicators.  
 
 As part of the methodology for each valuation, a thorough inspection of the 
whole property and soil analysis should be undertaken.  This should include 
complete measurement of the property boundaries so as to confirm the actual 
property size with the property description in legal documents and property 
registration.  Potential beneficiaries, the accompanying organization, Fondo 
de Tierras, the property owner and the firm contracted to complete the 




 Fondo de Tierras should consider developing an area or department to 
monitor, evaluate and follow up on all aspects of its mandate.  
 
 Internal standards for implementation of the Fondo de Tierras policies 
should be revised in order to reflect internal multisectorial functions. This 
means that the Directive Council, the highest decision making body, not the 
executive managing body should direct and define the Fondo de Tierras 
policies.    
 
d. Credit Approval  
 
 To avoid duplication of workload, the technical assistance firm should 
assume responsibility for the productive project feasibility analysis.  This 
                                                 
39 Currently, in theory, the property valuation is not known neither  by the property vender nor  the purchaser but in practice the 
purchasing community take the valuation into consideration when negotiating.  
40 BANRURAL -  Rural Bank  
should be incorporated into the technical assistance framework, pre-contract 
and be the basis for developing the productive plan for the property. This 
will ensure that the technical assistance firms become involved in the 
selected properties earlier in the process and will be dedicated to quality and 
efficient selection processes.  The initial productivity analysis will be the 
basis for the evaluation and outcome of their future work. This will save time 
in initiating and implementing selected projects based on the real productive 
capacity of the property41 
 
 The productivity analysis should be undertaken only by the technical 
assistance firm and should include several transparency criteria such as:  
 
a. The professionals contracted by the technical assistance firms should 
present their study, analysis and conclusions in a legally binding 
document in which they swear under oath that their findings are true 
and correct.  
b. Standard format, methodology and contents should be established for 
the analysis so as to facilitate evaluation and verification.  
c. The productivity analysis should include criteria related to 
productivity and not only the financial possibilities as is presently the 
case.  
d. The role of the independent consultants who currently complete the 
diagnostic productive study could be to audit the study undertaken by 
technical assistance firms according to the terms defined by Fondo de 
Tierras. 
e. Members of the beneficiary communities and not just the board of 
directors of the community (as is currently the practice) should be 
consulted during the productive study.  
f. The productivity study should include an analysis of soil capacity and 
land use . 
g. The professional qualifications and fulfillment of technical, legal and 
tax requirements of the technical assistance firms contracted for the 




 Effective participation of the beneficiaries in defining subsidy use must be 
guaranteed.  
 
 The subsidy amount per family should be increased. The FONTIERRAS law 
indicates that the subsidy should be no less than 26 minimum salaries, with the 
option of increasing the amount. Results of this study show that the subsidy 
amount is insufficient and does not cover food security costs (such as transport 
to the property), in particular work capital. In some cases, despite having fully 
paid for the property, there are no resources remaining for employment 
generating capital. In other cases funds remaining are insufficient to cover the 
                                                 
41 Presently the productivity study and productivity management plan of the property is undertaken with the objective having the 
property purchase approved. This means that the productivity study determines the productivity and purchase of the property, as 
well as the amount and destiny of the subsidiary. Even though these studies are the basis for the decision-making process and 
purchase of the property, they are based on one requisite and later duplicate work, when the technical assistance firm completes the 
majority of the study a second time.  
operational plan for the property, which is designed based on the productive 
capacity of the property and productive projects, to generate conditions to enable 
payment of the property.42 This situation is further complicated when vacant 
land and not properties with existing infrastructure are purchased43. The fertile 
productivity of the land is exhausted from previous poor management, 
deforested and eroded, for this reason the land is not considered to be a 
productive property.44 The subsidy should be based on the property productivity 
management plan and be increased to be more than the 26 minimum salaries.  
 
 The following should be prioritized within the subsidy: 
 
1. Increases in the percentage and quantity of the subsidy allocated to 
the move to the property, food security and basic housing for the 
beneficiaries. This aims to strengthen food security and prevent 
dissertations. 
 
2. Increases in the percentage and quantity of the subsidy for capital 
investment according to the productive management plan for the 
property.  
 
 The subsidy should be granted at the time the beneficiaries move to the property 
with the aim of initiating productive project simultaneously. The subsidy should 
be granted at the same time as the property is handed to the beneficiaries, so as 
to prevent any delays that might affect the move, initiation and implementation 
of productive projects.  
 
 Subsidy reception and payment should be agreed upon via a participatory 
process and in consensus with the beneficiaries in order to prevent delays and 
irregularities. Management of the resources allocated to work capital should be 
defined by the beneficiaries together with the technical assistance firms and not 
imposed by the firms and/or Fondo de Tierras. Resources received from Fondo 
de Tierras and purchased as part of the subsidy should not be managed solely by 
the technical assistance firms. Such capital should not be subject to interest fees, 
which violates the contents and spirit of the Fondo de Tierras law.  
 
f. The debt amount, terms, interest free period and interest rates 
 
 All of the beneficiaries should have a clear understanding of the debt amount, 
terms, interest free period and the interest rates. FONTIERRAS  should 
undertake an informative campaign on all elements that affect the credit policy. 
This campaign should raise awareness of debt magnitude, implications and 
payment mechanisms. Information on new interest rates and interest free periods 
                                                 
42 The amount allocated for capital investment for the productivity study (which in some cases is known by the Board of Directors 
of the community and never by the community General Assembly), does not coincide with the amount calculated in the property 
management and project plans designed by the technical assistance firms (management plans are confirmed by the Board of 
Directors). For this reason other sources of funding must be found, which may be restricted to only funding the beneficiaries. Thus 
in the majority of properties projects are not viable and do not provide capital for the beneficiaries nor are the projects capable of 
generating savings and debt payments.  
43 Here the study refers to the different experiences when groups have purchased vacant land, and when groups have purchased 
farms or properties with existing infrastructure, such as housing, sheds etc. 
44 Due to this situation a greater portion of the subsidy must  be allocated to capital investment, which should include resources 
required to improve soil and similar investments as well as transport to the property and establishment of the community.  
should also be included in the campaign as many of the  beneficiaries do not 
have access to this information. 
 
 The interest free period should begin at the same time as the subsidy is handed 
over, not at the time of receiving the property. The interest free period should be 
defined in accordance with the productive projects and the productive feasibility 
of the property as outlined in the productive management plan of the property. 
Previous experience indicates that this period fluctuates between five and seven 
years.  
 
 BANRURAL should begin charges from the date of complete granting of the 
subsidy.45 
 
 Communication between FONTIERRAS and BANRURAL on national and 
regional levels should be improved. In some cases the two institutions operate 
with different debt totals, due to additional debt generated by interest rates. This 
affects the beneficiaries who have to travel to the Fondo de Tierras head office 
to resolve the problem46. 
 
 Repayments should  be smaller amounts initially, as beneficiaries have less 
opportunities for income generation when first starting new productive projects. 
Such projects require several production cycles before achieving efficiency and 
implanting new technology, which enables higher returns.  
 
 The terms of debt payment should be drawn up based on the specific conditions 
of each property which should be determined by a system of indicators.  
 
g. The move and dissertations47  
 
 Undertake an informative campaign for the beneficiaries of Fondo de Tierras, 
with the objective of informing communities about interest rates and new 
interest free periods.  Some beneficiaries desert the community because of high 
debt repayments and initial interest rates.  
 
 Assist the beneficiaries in locating properties in geographic regions with similar 
climatic and cultural conditions to their place of origin. 
  
 Improve mechanisms for identifying the target population so that all for the 
beneficiaries move to the new property. 
 
 Promote the signing of a contract or commitment agreement that specifies the 
condition of moving to the property in order to qualify as a beneficiary.  
 
                                                 
45 At the moment the Economic Reactivation fund, which is part of the capital subsidy has not been received.  
46 BANRURAL collects the repayments, even when FONTIERRAS has not issued the total subsidy amount. There are discrepancies 
over the debt and interest figures registered with Fondo de Tierras and the bank, due to inefficient communication between both 
institutions.  
47 There are currently 33 properties that have experienced problems with dissertations. No further funds are assigned 
until this problem is resolved, for this reason the legal area of Fondo de Tierra should resolve the problem. There also exists 
problems with names and surnames of some of the beneficiaries).  
 
 Manage complimentary investments of basic services before the community 
moves to the property, such as drinking water, electricity, rural roads, minimum 




Design project and productive infrastructure investment strategies for the financial 
and productive sustainability of the property with the following elements: 
 
 Promote a balance between productive projects for food security and project 
designed to cover debt payments, as well as projects for exportation and the 
national market. The later should be based on the need to consolidate 
organization within the communities and their food security. Therefore the 
projects should provide food security in the short term and facilitate debt 
repayment in the long term. 
 
 Fondo de Tierras should ensure that beneficiaries are aware of the existence of 
other institutions such as the Institute for Agricultural Science and Technology 
(ICTA in Spanish) that could assist with new seeds for basic grains and 
vegetables, PROFRUTA which could assist in installing fruit nurseries and 
plantations, the National Forestry Institute (INAB in Spanish) which could assist 
in reforestation, PLAMAR which could assist with irrigation systems and other 
national and international entities, government and non-government 
organizations that fund productive and social projects.  
 
 Promote the implementation of micro regional and intercommunity projects that 
take advantage of the economies of scale.  
 
i. Technical Assistance: 
 
Fondo de Tierras should define a new policy on technical assistance that includes the 
following elements: 
 
• The beneficiaries participate in the selection, audit and inspection of the 
technical assistance firm. The beneficiaries should have a clear understanding 
of the terms of the contract, and expected results presented in the plan designed 
by the firm. 
  
• A medium and long term perspective, which incorporates the process of 
transferring new technology and the transformation of small agricultural 
producers into highly productive producers with management capacity.  
 
• A holistic approach to rural development, that is not focused only on 
agricultural and forestry production but also receiving basic services such as 
education, health, housing, organization, professional capacity building and 
productive infrastructure investment amongst others.  
 
• Include gender perspective and women’s participation in all decision making, 
such as the productive processes, guaranteeing access to administration of 
economic resources and the distribution of economic benefits generated within 
the community.  
 
• Adopt an approach that takes into consideration the cultural diversity, in 
particular the language of the beneficiaries.  
 
• Implement one technical assistance methodology, that incorporates the process 
of introducing new technologies. Apart from crops that have a short cycle, such 
as basic grains and vegetables, it might be necessary to establish “demonstration 
plots” for the introduction of new technologies. This ensures that the 
beneficiaries have the chance to experiment with the use of new technologies, 
manage the crop and then begin commercial plots. The implementation of this 
methodology should be established in a technical working agreement between 
the Fondo de Tierras and the Institute for Agricultural Science and Technology, 
so that the technical assistance firms use this technique to transfer technology.  
 
• The technical assistance firms should contract personal with proven experience 
in rural development, taking into consideration that the beneficiaries moving to 
the property will construct a new community and will require significant 
accompaniment and orientation provided by “technical assistance for integrated 
rural development” more than by a technical assistance based on agricultural 
and forestry production. 
  
• Technical assistance provided by firms should be coordinated according to 
zones, based on the rural development policies that include development zones 
and “megaprojects” in which various properties participate. These projects 
lower costs, improve services and increase productivity and profitability of the 
properties.  
 
 In order to guarantee transparency contracts should specify, services and quality 
control mechanisms. A supervisory and social auditing system needs to be 
developed for the private firms contracted for technical assistance. The system 
should include the following criteria: human resources and technical education, 
contents, technology transfer, methodology, timeframe and frequency of the 
technical assistance amongst other criteria. 
 
 The technical assistance should be universal and permanent and should be 
presented over the medium term within the framework of a national capacity 
building, formation and technical assistance program. This program should be 
presented by several State institutions. The technical assistance should evolve 
towards long term assistance. The priorities should be moving towards 
marketing and identifying markets.  
 
 Technical assistance should be permanent and definition of contracts should be 
an efficient and rapid process. As many contracts are currently yearly, 
recontracting each year causes considerable delays in the productive projects.  
 
 More attention should be given to the capacity building and formation of women 
so that they may participate in the productive process.  
 
 Literacy plans for both men and women should be included. 
 
 The Fondo de Tierras should help with the organic certification of the 
agricultural products produced by the beneficiaries. 
 
j. Other FONTIERRAS responsibilities 
 
 The Fondo de Tierras should include a marketing and production promoting 
program for the products generated on the properties. This program should 
include a regional production system, production diversification, market 
identification, invest in infrastructure and create alliances between producers and 
marketers, so as to eliminate the middlemen. The State should implement this 
program over the medium term as part of a rural development strategy. 
  
 A coordinating body should be established between Fondo de Tierras, Social 
Funds, the Ministry of Agriculture, BANRURAL, and the Institute for 
Agricultural Science and Technology, amongst other institutes, with the goal of 
promoting investment in rural development and productive infrastructure.  
 
 Fondo de Tierras should develop a fund to strengthen capacity and research in 
specific topics, tailored specifically for the technical assistance personal, the 
beneficiaries and accompanying organizations. Agreements between other 
national and international institutions to develop this program should be 
promoted. Examples could be: technical assistance support, technology transfer, 





a. An increase in the FONTIERRAS budget, so that demand can be met 
 
Given that land access is a problematic issue that has historical roots of great 
magnitude, there is no rapid short-term solution. A realistic solution over the long term 
would be to meet the demand that will increase from the year 2003 onwards. If a 
program of this nature were implemented the demand accumulated by 2002 will remain 
constant. In relative terms this means that in the medium and long term, percentage 
wise, demand will reduce as the economically active population in the rural areas 
increases.  
 
The following table illustrates the estimated increase in financial resources required for 
land purchase, in order to maintain constant demand in absolute terms. It also shows 






























 ( a ) ( b ) ( c ) ( d ) ( e ) ( f ) ( g ) ( h ) ( i ) 
1998 42,182,946 0 0 42,182,946 7,283,000 34,899,945 3,244,842 13 84 1090
1999 40,387,852 0 0 40,387,852 8,243,000 32,144,850 2,375,756 17 77 1315
2000 64,170,765 0 0 64,170,765 21,246,486 42,924,134 1,426,017 45 57 2583
2001 222,312,906 0 0 222,312,906 70,084,585 152,228,320 3,768,015 59 83 4886
2002 222,000,000 4,138,414 0 226,138,414 65,467,071 160,671,343 3,768,015 60 75 4,501
2003 522,664,451 7,950,131 100,000,000 630,614,582 182,562,921 448,051,660 3,768,015 167 75 12,552
2004 932,717,264 12,614,480 100,000,000 1,045,331,744 302,623,540 742,708,204 3,768,015 277 75 20,807
2005 1,342,554,620 27,903,687 100,000,000 1,470,458,307 425,697,680 1,044,760,627 3,768,015 390 75 29,269
2006 1,782,440,004 48,733,233 50,000,000 1,881,173,237 544,599,652 1,336,573,585 3,768,015 499 76 37,943
Source: Own material. 
 
( a ) Average annual credit.  
( b ) Based on previous experience it is calculated that 67% of loans and interest is recuperated. 
( c ) Commercial bank funds with market interest rates: 5% +14% subsidy = 19% 
( d ) Amount available for new credits ( a ) + ( b ) + ( c ). 
( e ) Initial annual payment 28.95% for the years 2002 to 2006. 
( f ) From the year 2002 a 7% (equal to inflation) is calculated. 
( g ) The total sum when dividing available credit by the price of land.  
( h ) Number of  beneficiary families is equivalent to the average number for 1998 to 2001 
( i ) Average number of beneficiary families per year. 
 
 
As well as increasing the FONTIERRAS budget, it is necessary to increase the budget 
assigned to the Fondo de Garantías and apply complimentary mechanisms that promote 
commercial participation in resources for land purchase. To simplify calculations the 
proposal only includes the State budget and funds allocated to Guarantee Fund have 
been calculated at a set amount. It must be noted that this initiative would also require a 
substantial increase in the resources allocated to the Fondo de Garantías.  
 
Table 5 shows the following results: the FONTIERRAS budget needs to increase 
substantially each year until it reaches a total of US $ 229 million48 in 2006.  This figure 
accommodated demand for the next five years (including 2002), 105 thousand families 
and the purchase of 1,394 properties. Such an effort, as shown in the following tables, 
reduces by 50% the demand for land, the number of families that do not have access or 
ownership of land that is less than 436.8 meters squared in approximately 30 years 










                                                 
48 Calculated at the Exchange rate of 7.75 Quetzals to the US Dollar, 2002 
Table 5 
Beneficiary families and unsatisfied demand according to scenario 3 (per thousand) 
Year Demand Families % demand met Unsatisfied demand 
1979 181.40    
1998 290.53 1.09 0.38 289.44 
1999 297.83 1.32 0.44 296.51 
2000 305.30 2.58 0.85 302.72 
2001 312.96 4.89 1.56 308.08 
2002 320.82 4.50 1.40 316.32 
2003 328.87 12.55 3.82 316.32 
2004 337.13 20.81 6.17 316.32 
2005 345.59 29.27 8.47 316.32 
2006 354.26 37.94 10.71 316.32 
Source: Calculations based on table 4. The National Agrarian Census 1979 and the National Population 
Census 1980 were used to calculate demand. Human Development Report, United Nations in Guatemala. 
 
Table 6 
Percentage of unmet land demand per five years 
% respecto de la PEA 
% demand % demand unmet Year 
(a) (b) (b)/(a) 
2000 6.42% 6.37% 99.15% 
2005 6.39% 5.85% 91.53% 
2010 6.36% 5.14% 80.86% 
2015 6.32% 4.52% 71.43% 
2020 6.29% 3.97% 63.11% 
2025 6.26% 3.49% 55.75% 
2030 6.22% 3.07% 49.25% 
Source: own material 
 
b. The increased FONTIERRAS budget and the possible increase in the Fondo de 
Garantías budget should be generated through taxes on idle land  
 
The financial impact of the proposed Fondo de Tierras budget in relation to the Gross 
Domestic Product will increase from 0.12% in the year 2002 to 0.68% in the year 2006.  
If it is assumed that the State budget remains at 13.7% of the Gross Domestic Product as 
in the current year, then the FONTIERRAS budget will be approximately 5% of the 
budget.   
 
It can be seen that the impact on Gross Domestic Product is minimal, however in 
relation to the State General Income and Expenditure Budget there are increases, given 
this is low compared to the Gross Domestic Product and the development needs of the 
country.  
 
However, the FONTIERRAS budget increase is viable as part of fiscal reforms as 
outlined in the Peace Accords and the Fiscal Agreement, especially if a tax is applied to 
idle lands and income generated from this tax is allocated to FONTIERRAS. 
Table 7 
Percentage of the FONTIERRAS budget 
 GDP Public Budget 
2000 0.04% 0.34% 
2001 0.14% 0.94% 
2002 0.12% 0.93% 
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